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Abstract of
Objectives of the Soviet Merchant ~~rine
In this connection the development and use of merchant fleets of
various countries in peacetime are constantly in the sphere of that
economic and political struggle in the international arena. vhf.ch
continue~ to remain an unchanged accompaniment of antagonistic social
systems.
Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov
In the years since the end of the Second World War, no aspect of
merchant shipping has created greater controversy than the phenomenal
growth of the merchant fleet of the Soviet Union. Starting in 1945
with a makeshift fleet that was a motley collection of obsolete
vessels, ships received as reparations from the defeated Axis nations
and Lend-Lease Liberty ships, the Soviets have fashioned a modern.
efficient merchant marine that is currently second in the world in
numbers of ships and sixth in deadweight tonnage. Employed as a
powerful instrument of the Soviet state, this fleet now competes
effectively with Western shipping lines throughout every corner of the
globe.
This paper will examine the remarkable rise of the Soviet
merchant marine with particular emphasis on the objectives of this
growth. For ease of discussion, political, economic and military
objectives will be evaluated separately, although, in reality, these
aims are often closely intertwined and dependent on each other. This
analysis will reveal why the Soviet Union, once regarded strictly as a
continental power, is now a maritiDle superpower and, given her
economic development plans, will become even more dependent on her
~erchant fleet in the future.
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CHAPTER I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE
The Soviet Union is the largest country in the world, with a
landmass covering approximately one-sixth of the Earth. From a
maritime perspective, it has the world's longest coastline, nearly
47,000 kilometers (or over 29,000 miles). The USSR borders on three
oceans and thirteen seas. Yet, from a Western outlook the Soviet
Union has always been considered e continental power with little real
interest in the use of the seas. Geographical disadvantages, such as
lack of open ocean access, and deplorable environmental conditions
along most of the Soviet coast have tended to confirm Western
convictions that the USSR was and would remain strictly a land power.
Thus, the remarkable rise of the Soviet merchant marine over the past
thirty years has been a source of astonishment and controversy among
Free World shipping interests.
Western belief in the apparent indifference of the Soviet Union
towards maritime power was established by the virtually complete
disregard the Russians showed towards merchant shipping in the early
part of the century. In the years preceding World War One, the
merchant fleet of Czar Nicholas II was woefully inadequate.
Consisting, in 1914, of some 1,040 ships, the Russian fleet was
1primarily made up of old, obsolete vessels and sailing ships.
Despite the fact that three quarters of Russia's foreign trade
1
involved ocean transport, only seven percent of its exports and
fifteen percent of j.ts imports were carried in Russian bottoms. 2
Shipping demands required the Czar's government to charter foreign
tonnage at an annual cost of 150 million roubles, further straining
3the faltering Russian economy.
Origin of the Soviet Fleet. The Great October Socialist
Revolution in 1917 swept away the Czarist government and plunged the
country into chaos. Russian shipping companies, many of which were
joint stock companies owned by foreign interests, sought to have their
ships escape the upheaval. In order to prevent the loss of these
vessels, the Council of People's Commissars! acting at that point as
the supreme Soviet governing body, on November 24, 1917 issued a
decree "On Prohibiting the Sale, Pawning, and Chartering out of
Russian Merchant Ships to Foreign Nationals or Institutions." To
further establish the control of the new government over these
vital assets, in February 1918, Lenf.n signed a "Decree on the
Nationalization of the Merchant Fleet. ,,4 The subsequent cLvd.L ~Tar and
foreign intervention resulted in the loss or considerable damage to
most of the Soviet merchant fleet. This internal strife devastated an
already inadequate fleet and damaged many port areas.
With the triumph of the Bolshevik forces and the end of the
civil war, the attention of the Soviet government turned towards the
restoration of the country. In order to rebuild its r,hattered
industries, the USSR was required to import sophisticated equipment
and machinery, paying for these products with the natural resources
and raw materials it had available for export. By 1922, the
inadequacies of the Soviet merchant marine, with a total deadweight
2
5tonnage of only 600,000 tons, were readily apparent. As a result of
the shortages in its own merchant fleet, the USSR was forced to
charter foreign tonnage. This, in turn, required expenditure from the
Soviet Union's scare stores of hard currency. In recognition of the
critical importance of shipping, the Tenth Party Congress of the
Communist Perty of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in March 1922, directed
the reconstruction of the shipbuilding industry.
One of the few measures to strengthen the merchant fleet taken
by the Imperial government was the establishment in 1876 of a
government shipping agency known as the "Volunteer Fleet" company.
Implemented by Czar Alexander II to expand Russian maritime power,
6the government shipping company proved largely ineffective.
Nevertheless, the Volunteer Fleet provided the framework that, in
1922, commenced Soviet shipping activity. By June of that year, four
shipping companies - the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea-Azov and Caspian
7
companies - were in operation. These companies were initially run in
accordance with standard commercial practices. This meant that the
companies often competed against each other; a position that was, as
noted by the Journal of the ARsociation of Soviet Shipowners, Soviet
Shipping, an unacceptable solution to the USSR's shipping woes.
The availability of several shipping companies in the country,
and the resultant competition on the domestic market, impaired the
position of the Soviet merchant marine in seaborne trade and
barred its further growth. The necessity emerged to establish a
center to §oncert shipping commercial activities on a countrywide
scale, •••
The resolution of the difficulty occurred on July 18, 1924 with the
government approval of the founding of a company entitled Sovtorgflot
(Soviet merchant marine). With this measure, the merchant fleet
became a fully integrated part of the Soviet planned economy.
3
Initial efforts to revive the Soviet merchant marine
concentrated on the repair and restoration of available ships. As a
result, by 1928 approximately 80 percent of the Soviet fleet was over
920 years old. The need for new ships was obvious and the first Five
Year Plan (1928-1933) focused considerable attention on the
rejuvenation of the merchant marine. The plan called for the doubling
of the fleet's tonnage as well as a fourfold increase in the amount of
10
cargo carried by sea. Soviet shipyards undertook the building of a
variety of ship types including some that were ice-strengthened for
Arctic service.
While the Russian shipyards geared up for production of merchant
vessels. the demand for shipping still far outstripped national
supply. The Soviets were therefore forced to turn to foreign sources
of shipping to satisfy their trade requirements. The USSR took a
two-pronged approach, chartering tonnage to satisfy immediate demand
while also placing orders in foreign yards for the construction of new
ships to supplement the fleet being built in Soviet shipyards. The
onset of the Great Depression among the Western nations proved to be
of considerable benefit to the Soviet government as charges dropped
drastically. Additionally. foreign shipyards, eager for work of any
kind. gladly accepted Soviet crders, even at sharply reduced prices.
The Second World War. By the end of the first Five Year Plan in
1933, the USSR had received 136 new ships w:'-th a total cargo capacity
11
of over 450.000 tons. The second Five Year Plan (1933-1937) sought
to sustain the growth of the merchant fleet through the continued
acquisiton of new ships. However, the rise of militarist governments
in Germany, Italy and Japan caused the Soviets to refocus their
4
attention on naval forceE. The shipbuilding industry reoriented itself
towards fulfilling the increased demands of the Soviet Navy. Despite
the lofty goals for merchant shipping in the second and third Five
Year Plans, little progress towards improving the fleet was actually
12
made in the years leading up to World War Two.
With the onset of war, the Soviet Navy assumed control of the
merchant fleet. These ships were employed in direct support of
military operations and, as a result, sustained enormous losses.
During the course of the war, the Soviet merchant fleet suffered the
loss of 380 ships and severe damage to most of its remaining
13
vessels. Additionally, the bitter fighting and policy of total
destruction followed by both the German and Soviet forces resulted in
devastation to the USSR's port infrastructure. Twenty four Soviet
seaports fell into German control during the war; they were rendered
virtually useless by the war's end. As a result of the conflict, over
two-thirds of the USSR's berths were destroyed as well as over three
14quarters of the warehousing facilities and cargo handling equipment.
The terrible devastation of the Second World War meant that the
post-war Soviet maritime efforts would essentially require rebuilding
the entire merchant fleet end its shoreside supporting elements.
In order to aid its reconstruction efforts, the Soviet Union
sought ships as partial payment of reparations from the defeated Axis
powers. The Soviets also retained a large number of American built
Lend-Lease vessels despite strenuous efforts on the part of the U.S.
government to have them returned. In all, of 102 ships transferred to
the USSR for wartime use, only 14 were returned to the United
States. 15 In conjunction with the surviving Soviet vessels, this
5
varied collection of ships formed the shaky foundation of the USSR's
post-war maritime industry. By January 1, 1946, the fleet consisted
of 573 ships comprising 1,939,000 deadweight tons but many were
16
obsolete vessels pressed beyond their normal service life.
Stalin's immediate plans in the post-war period were to restore
the major shipyards and commence work on rebuilding the Soviet Navy.
A massive shipbuilding plan was developed with initial emphasis on
cruisers, destroyers and submarines, leading ultimately to the con-
struction of the first Soviet aircraft carriers. In order to conduct
out this enormous naval rearming, it was necessary to assign a much
lower priority to plans for the development of the merchant fleet.
While the maritime rebuilding effort was focused on the Navy,
the Soviet Union's efforts to restore its shattered industrial base
concentrated on exploiting the conquered lands of Eastern Europe. In
1949, the USSR established the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(C¥~A) with Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and, in
1950, East Germany as member nations. Although the organi7.ation was
theoretically designed to benefit all members, in reality it was
initially used as a means for the Soviets to secure resources and
manufactured goods from its satellites. Of particular note, the USSR,
acting through the CHEA, directed several of the member states, most
notably Poland, to develop a shipbuilding industry. Thus, while its
own shipyards were building naval vessels, the Soviet Union was able
to utili7.e the resources of the CMEA nations to restore its merchant
fleet.
Post-War Expansion. No development in the post-war period was
more crucial to th~ rise of the Soviet merchant marine than the death
6
of Stalin in March 1953 and the subsequent rise of Khrushchev to
power. The new Soviet leader swept aside many Stalinist theories,
particularly with regard to relations with non-Corr~unist states.
Khrushchev saw relations with the newly independent, less developed
countries as an opportunity not only for economic gain but also to
counter political moves by the West. In order to accomplish this, the
need for a strong merchant marine became immediately apparent as
increased foreign trade and aid programs quickly overwhelmed Soviet
flag capabilities.
The fifth Five Year Plan (1951-1955) directed greater attention
towards the rebuilding of the merchant fleet. The plan authorized
accelerated procurement of ships from abroad (generally CMEA
countr:fes) as well as improvements to the existing Soviet merchant
shipyards. Add:ftionally, new shipyards were constructed and ports
were modernized. Despite these improvements, the Soviet merchant
marine was unable to keep up with the sharply increased demands placed
on it. Khrushchev's new foreign policy called for "peaceful co-
existence" and increased trade with the West while simultaneously
attempting to gain political influence in the less developed countries
through aid and trade. As Table One indicates, Soviet foreign trade
expanded enormously during the period of Khrushchev's leadership
(1955-1964). While trade with other Rocialist states remained of
primary importance, commerce with the West as well as with developing
lands achieved significant growth rates. In order to meet its many
trade commitments, the Soviet Union was forced to charter Western
ships. This, in turn, reduced the USSR's already scare supply of
Western hard currency. The need for a larger merchant fleet had
become a matter of pressing urgency for the Soviet leadership.
7
TABLE ONE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S FOREIGN TRADE
1947-1967
Billion Roubles
Total Trade
With SocLal.fs t
Countries
With Industrially
Developed Countries
With Developing
Countries
19l:7
1.4
0.8
0.5
0.1
1952
4.8
3.9
0.7
0.2
1957
7.5
5.5
1.3
0.7
1967
16.4
11.1
3.4
1.9
Source: David Fairhall, Russian Sea Power (Boston: Gambit
Incorporated, 1971), p. 63.
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Seven Year Plan. At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956,
Khrushchev announced sweeping economic changes for the Soviet Union.
One goal he highlighted was the development of a strong merchant fleet
that could carry Soviet trade and foreign aid anywhere in the world.
To achieve this aim, a special Seven Year Plan (1959-1965) was
developed. Among its ambitious goals were the doubling of merchant
marine tonnage and seaborne cargo, an increase in ship days at sea to
311 from the 1959 level of 278 and the handling of 60 to 70 percent
17
more cargo by Soviet ports.
With the merchant marine assuming a preeminent role in hoth
economic and political planning, explosive growth of the fleet soon
occurred. In contrast to previous plans, during the Seven Year Plan
Soviet authorities made the costly but necessary investments to bring
the program to fruition. As depicted in Table Two, the goal of the
plan to double merchant fleet tonnage by 1965 was surpassed by a
considerable margin. Through this enormous effort, the Soviet Union
was able to raise itself from a 1959 ranking of twelfth among the
world's maritime nations to its 1965 ranking cf sixth. Other aims of
the Seven Year Plan were also achieved as the fleet's average
operational time increased twelve percent. Additionally, freighter
produetivity rose thirty five percent while tankers experienced a
i . 18twenty s x percent J.ncrease.
Table Three depicts the composition of the fleet during the
period of its most explosive growth (1959-1965) as a result of the
Seven Year Plan. It is interesting to note in the table the
categories in which the Soviet merchant marine gained the greatest
number of ships during this period of rapid expansion. Although
9
TABLE TWO
GROt~ OF THE SOVIET MERCFJrnT FLEET
1954-1985
Number of Deadweight Tons
Ships* (in Thousands)
1954 563 2,181
1958 774 3,809
1965 1,345 9,561
1970 1,942 11,322
1975 2,404 18,250
1980 2,530 21,757
1985 2,531 23,875
*Oceangoing ships of 1,000 gross tons and over.
Sources: U.S., Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Annual Report for 1954 (pp. 56-57) and Merchant Fleets of
the World, 1958 (pp. 2-3), 1965 (pp. 6-7), 1970 (pp. 6-7).
1975 (pp. 2-3), 1981 (pp. 2-3), and 1985 (pp. 6-7)
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).
10
TABLE THREE
COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT FLEET BY SHIP TYPE
1954, 1958, and 1965*
1954 1958 1965
Combination Passenger 71 72 80
and Cargo
Freighters 425 575 868
Bulk Carriers 16 35 165
Tankers 51 92 232
*Note: Table Five (p. 25) provides the composition of the Soviet
Fleet as of January I, 1985.
Sources: U.S., Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Annual Report for 1954 (pp. 56-57) and Merchant Fleets of
the World, 1958 (pp. 2-3), and 1965 (pp. 6-7) (Washington,
D.C.: Government Print:f.ng Office).
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freighters achieved the largest total gain in terms of vessels added
to the fleet, bulk carriers and tankers experienced the greatest
relative increases. This was, in part, a reflection of the changing
pattern of Soviet trade and foreign policy. Expanded trade with
developing nations resulted in the import of greater quantities of raw
materials. Hence, the bulk carrier fleet had to be enlarged to handle
the increased demand. The expansion of the tanker fleet reflected not
only greater involvement by the Soviet Union in the world oil market
but also the growing demands of its allies. In particular. the entry
of Cuba into the Soviet political sphere placed enormous requirements
on the USSR's merchant tankers since this island nation was totally
dependent on the Soviet Union for its oil supply.
Improvements in Fleet Productivity. Although the Seven Year
Plan had achieved spectacular success in expanding the merchant
marine, the Soviet fleet still contained large numbers of older, less
efficient vessels. Accordingly, subsequent Five Year Plans sought to
upgrade the quality of the merchant fleet. The eighth Five Year Plan
(1966-1970) continued the emphasis on adding new ships but also
assigned productivity goals to the ports as well as the merchant
vessels. Increased efficiency was highlighted in all aspects of the
shipping industry. A cost savings goal of seventeen percent for dry
cargo and twenty percent for tanker transport was directed for the
19fleet. Ports were assigned goals of increased total cargo handling
as well as reduced ship idle time.
In order to achieve these qualitative improvements, the Soviet
Union continued to spend enormous sums of money on the merchant fleet
and its supporting infrastructure. As a result of a twenty five
12
percent increase in funding, port facilities were upgraded throughout
the country as new mechani7.ed equipment and procedures were
introduced. With the ongoing entry of new ships and the scrapping of
older vessels, by 1970 eighty percent of the Soviet merchant fleet was
20less than ten years old. The lofty goals of the eighth Five Year
Plan were attained as the drive to iIDprove the merchant marine
sustained its momentum.
Despite the great stress placed upon increased efficiency by
Soviet planners, the merchant marine proved to be slow in adopting the
improved cargo handling techniques developed in the West.
Containerization caused a revolution in the Western liner trades with
its sharply increased productivity while LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship)
and Seabee barge carriers offered sjmilar gains in efficiency. In the
tanker trades, VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carrier) and ULCCs (Ultra Large
Crude Carrier) provided shippers the advantages of economies of scale
as these ships reached sizes up to 500,000 deadweight tons. The
Soviet merchant marine initially failed to follow the example of its
Western counterparts due to a repressive combination of caution,
bureaucratic inertia and lack of advanced shipbuilding technology.21
The ninth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) finally addressed the
Soviet need for container ships. The Twenty Fourth Congress of the
CPSU in April 1971 directed the merchant marine to "expand
22
containerized cargo shipments by introducjng large-load containers."
Funding was provided for the continued modernization of the fleet as
well as port improvements. As in the previous plan, greater
efficiency was sought through increases jn worker productivity, both
afloat and ashore. In the ports, cargo handling was to rise by
13
eighteen percent while total freight traffic was directed to expand
significantly. Increased worker productivity was to be responsible
for forty two percent of the projected increase in cargo handling and
sixty five percent of the plan's goal in freight traffic. 23
The ambitious goals of the ninth Five Year Plan were not
entirely achieved. Soviet ship deliveries fell short of the planned
amount as did the cargo carriage performance. Despite these failures.
the period of the ni.nth Five Year Plan was one of significant
qualitative improvement for the Soviet merchant marine. Although
ships had been previously converted for container service. in 1971 the
Soviets built their first full containership, the Sestroretsk. The
port of Nakhodka, on the Soviet Pacific coast, was the first to
utilize a container terminal, commencing full operation in 1973. 24
Additionally, the USSR began to employ roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro)
vessels in various trades. These ships, most of which were purchased
abroad, offered the versatility of carrying wheeled vehicles and
containers in varying combinations. Finally, during this period the
Soviet Union took delivery of the first ships of its largest class of
25tanker, the Krym class at 150,000 deadweight tons.
The tenth Five Year Plan 0976-1980), while continuing to
emphasize efficiency in fleet and port operations. set a more modest
goal for expansion of the merchant marine. The explosive growth of
the 1950s and 1960s gave way to a relentless drive for qualitative
improvement. Although the fleet grew by over 4.2 million deadweight
tons, an increase of twenty one percent, the total number of ships
26increased only 2.5 percent. Reflecting a trend in Western shipptng,
the average deadweight tonnage of the new Soviet ships increased
14
markedly. The tenth Five Year Plan resulted in the acquisition of
such advanced ship types as lighter carriers (LASH), Arktika class
nuclear powered icebreakers, gas carriers and heavy lift vessels of
the Stakhanovets Rotov class, as well as ongoing procurement of
container and ro-ro ships and Krym class tankers. Port development
continued to receive considerable attention as the Soviets endeavored
to upgrade their cargo handling operations. Additional container
terminals were placed in operation in Leningra~, Ilyichevsk, Archangel
and Nakhodka while new facilities, warehouses and quayfronts were
~7built in ports throughout the country.~
As the merchant marine entered the 1980s, Soviet planners had
several notable achievements of which they could be proud. Starting
in the late 1940s with an incongruous collection of obsolete ships,
war reparations vessels and Lend Lease ships, they fashioned a fleet
that, by 1980, could sail end compete anywhere in the world. Equipped
with some of the most modern ships available, the Soviets skillfully
employed their assets on the world trades in steadfast pursuit of
their objectives. Similarly, the ports of the USSR were rebuilt from
their shattered, post-war state to modern, efficient facilities with
the most technologically advanced equipment available. The
development of a strong, competitive merchant fleet truly represented
a triumph for the Soviet Union.
15
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE
In a tightly regulated, centrally directed economy, it is
axiomatic that the merchant marine should be closely controlled. Such
has been the case in the Soviet Union since the creation of the
Sovtorgflot (Soviet Merchant Marine) company on July 18, 1924. Acting
through the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet or its bureaucratic
predecessors, the Soviet government has maintained its command over
the merchant marine. Development of the fleet has been orchestrated
through the series of Five Year Plans which coordinate every aspect of
Soviet economic affairs.
In the 1920s, the Labor and Defense Council was the supreme body
responsible for the USSR's economy. It was this council which
approved the formation of Sovtorgflot and provided the initial
direction for development of the fleet. As a possible reflection of
the then woeful state of the Soviet merchant marine, it was originally
subordinated to the Commissariat of Railroads. Growing awareness of
the importance of the merchant fleet coupled with a desire to improve
its performance eventually led to an organizational change. On
January 30, 1931, the People's Commissariat for Water Transport, with
responsibility for both the merchant marine and river transport, was
1
organized.
16
The People's Commissariat for Water Transport retained its dual
responsibility until April 1939 when the People's Commissariat of Sea
Transport was formed. This organization exercised control strictly
over the merchant fleet. The next major bureaucratic change occurred
in March 1953 with the creation of the Ministry of Sea and River
Transport. combining once more the merchant marine and river transport
functions. In 1964 these duties were separated yet again with the
establishment of the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet. an organizational
?
change which remains effective to this date.~
In the current Soviet scheme of government. the Labor and
Defense Council has been replaced by the Council of Minister~ whose
chairman is the Premier of the USSR. Among its other duties. this
body is responsible for coordinating and directing the work of the
various ministries as well as ensuring the execution of the national
economic plan. The All-Union Ministry of the Merchant Fleet is
immediately subordinate to the Council of ~finisters. The current
Minister of the Merchant Fleet is Yuri Volmer. It is noteworthy that
he is only the third Minister of the Merch~nt Fleet since 1954.
Victor Bakaev was the Minister from 1954 to 1970. during the period of
enormous growth for the Soviet fleet. Following Bakaev's retirement
in 1970. Timofei Guzhenko led the Ministry until 1986. Gu?henko
oversaw the qualitative improvement of the fleet as it adopted the
latest technological innovatioIls. Volmer. appointed in 1986. started
his career as a deck officer and later. master of several merchant
ships. He also held a variety of senior shoreside management
3positions prior to his appointment.
17
Merchant Marine Bureaucracy. The Ministry of the Merchant
Fleet, as the state agency responsible for merchant shipping,
exercises jurisdiction over not only the vessels but their shore based
support facilities as well. Headquartered in Moscow, the Ministry,
inter alia, oversees fleet and port operations, plans future merchant
marine development and coordinates activities with other ministries.
Assisting the Minister is a collegium consisting of the First Deputy
Minister, three Deputy Ministers and the heads of key departments in
the Ministry. These principal departments represent a variety of
fleet and shores ide functional areas. Referred to as "Main
Administrations", there are departments assigned responsibility for
Fleet and Port Operations, Communications and Radio Navigation,
Mater:fal and Technical Supply, Navigation, Development and
Construction of Ports, Yards, and Other Shore Enterprises and so
forth. Additional departments, called "Administrations", are assigned
responsibility for matters such as commercial activity, legal and
economic concerns and a host of other bureaucratic affairs. 4
Within the Ministry's realm of responsibility are several
important state agencies, the most notable of which is Sovfracht.
This organization is responsible for chartering foreign ships for the
transport of Soviet trade in addition to arranging charters for Soviet
ships when excess capacity exists. In the 1950s and 1960s, as Soviet
trade expanded more rapidly than its merchant marine capacity,
Sovfracht exercised enormous influence on the world charter market.
Since the Soviet Union remains dependent to some extent on foreign
charters, Sovfracht continues to be a powerful factor in the market. 5
Furthermore, the 1979 assimilation of Sovinflot, the Soviet agency
18
responsible for port arrangements throughout the world, has added to
the significance of Sovfracht.
The Ministry of the Merchant Fleet is at the top of a three
tiered mana~ement structure. Beneath the Ministry, three State
Economic Associations of Maritime Transport comprise the second
functional level. These associations were initially formed in 1970 as
a management intermediary when expansion of the fleet made direct
control of the shipping companies by the Ministry unwieldy. Based on
broad geographic assignments, the associations, Sev7.apflot
(Northwestern Fleet), Yuzhflot (Southern Fleet) and Dal'flot (Far
Eastern Fleet), direct the operations of the shipping companies within
their areas. Table Four reflects the regional distribution of
companies within the merchant marine bureaucracy.
The ~ixteen shipping companies constitute the third level of
management. As noted previously, unlike Western shipping lines, the
Soviet companies have managerial obligations extending beyond the
operation of their ships. Within its assigned geographic area, each
company is responsible for functions such as management of port
facilitieB, including loading, discharging and terminal operations,
maintenance of tug and lighter service, navigation aids, operation of
ship repair yards and so on. Further, the company is required to
attend to the needs of its employees by providing housing, hospitals,
schools and other necessary facilities and services. The shipping
companie6 function as legal entities with acccuntability for the
assets under their control. Each company is provided working capital
and is expected to fulfill its economic goals and reflect a profit in
its operations.
19
TABLE FOUR
ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE
Council of Ministers
Ministry of the Merchant Fleet
Sev7.apflot
(Northern Fleet)
- Baltic Shipping
Company (SC)
- Estonian SC
- Latvian SC
- Lithuanian SC
- Murmansk SC
- Northern SC
Yuzhflot
(Southern Fleet)
- Azov Shipping
Company (SC)
- Black Sea SC
- Georgian SC
- Novorossisk SC
- Soviet Danube SC
- Caspian SC
Dal'Flot
(Far Eastern Fleet)
- Far Eastern Shipping
Company (SC)
- Kamchatka SC
- Primorsk SC
- Sakhalin SC
Source: Hans Bohme, "System, and Market Behavior of the Soviet
Merchant Marine," in The Challenge of Soviet Shipping,
ed. Curtis Cate (New York: National Strategy Information
Center, 1983), pp. 17-19.
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Pursuit of Profit. The subject of profits by the Soviet shipping
companies is one that, like a magician's trick, will baffle and amaze
those who examine it. Long a rancorous issue to Western shipping lines
which have accused the Soviets of rate cutting and operating at enormous
loss, the USSR has nevertheless always insisted its merchant fleet
produces a profit. "~ile this may be true, it does not provide the
complete picture. Dr. Hans Bohme of the University of Kiel's Institute
for World Economics, in his study of this issue, noted intervention by
Soviet central planning authorities, "Planners can - and in fact do -
1.nfluence the conditions (or indeed create them ad hoc) under which
profitability can be achieved.,,6 Among the measures employed are
direct subsidies, special foreign exchange conversion coefficients and
unrealistically low prices charged for new ships or equipment.
Recent policy changes announced by the Ministry of the Merchant
Marine, however, have seemingly put an end to such practices. Effective
January 1, 1987, the shipping companies are expected to operate on a
bona f:f.de profit basia. The head of the Ministry's Planning and
Finance Department, G. Gerasimchuk, elaborated on this in an article
in Soviet Shipping magazine, "Enterprises will now operate on the
basis of full-scale cost-accounting and self-financing ••• Revenue as
the main source of production and social development has been made the
basis of operation of the shipping companies and other merchant marine
enterprises." The measure appears to give the shipping companies even
greater autonomy in their operations, as Gerasimchuk indicates, "One of
the main goals of the reform is to give broader powers to enterprises so
.,
that their profits depend directly on their performance efficiency.,,1
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While this policy reform may still not ultimately result in Western
style commercial profit/loss determinations, it should nonetheless
prove to be a most interesting change in its execution.
Composition of the Fleet. The fleet with which the shipping
companies are expected to earn their profit is a product of Soviet
Union's Five Year Plans. As the merchant marine entered the 1980s, the
fleet had enjoyed a period of unprecedented growth. Having achieved the
expansion they desired, Soviet authorities, through the ninth and tenth
Five Year Plans, sought to make qualitative improvements to the merchant
marine with the addition of specialized tonnage and technologically
advanced cargo handling equipment ashore. The eleventh Five Year Plan
(1981-1985) focused on continuing this effort. Obsolescent vessels were
retired and modern, specialized ships took their place. Even just
compared to the previous plan, the eleventh Five Year Plan represented a
tempering of the fleet's growth. The 1976-1980 plan produced 235 new
ships totalling 4.2 million deadweight (dwt) tons and, by the end of
81980, the fleet stood at 2,530 ships of 21,757,000 dwt tons. In
contrast, the 1981-1985 plan produced 232 ships of 4 million dwt tons
and the 1985 total was 2,531 ships at 23,875,000 dwt tons. 9 In a
pattern similar to that of Western shipping interests, considerable
numbers of older vessels were replaced by fewer but larger and more
productive ships.
The objectives of the eleventh Five Year Plan represented a
maturing of sorts for the Soviet merchant marine. Although sheer
numbers of ships remained important to the planners, efficiency of
operation assumed a predominant role in fleet development. Of the
forty ship types under construction during the period of the 1981-1985
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plan, twenty five were of new design. 10 Soviet shipping personnel
stressed the procurement of such advanced ship types as ro-ros, LASH
barge carriers, refrigerator and container ships. Particular emphasis
was placed on ships suitable for Arctic service. Hull strengthened
cargo ships, Finnish built Arctic tankers and small reefer ships
supplemented the vessels serving the Northern Sea Route. Pressing
relentlessly ahead in its efforts to develop year round shipping in
this region, the USSR began construction of the Rossiya, a nuclear
powered icebreaker of the Leonid Brezhnev (Arktika) class, as well as
the Sevmorput, the world's first nuclear powered barge carrier capable
11
of carrying seventy three 500 ton barges or 1300 containers.
Although the Soviets were slow to adopt container technology,
the continuing attention this facet of shipping received in
progressive Five Year Plans enabled them to make tremendous strides
towards rectifying their earlier negligence. Over 50 container ships
as well as anotller 57 container capable ro-ros are now employed by the
12
merchant fleet. The Soviets were quick to grasp the significance of
the land-bridge concept of container movement and initiated the
Trans-Siberian Container Service between Europe and the USSR's Pacific
ports. In order to more effectively manage every aspect of container
shipping, a new organization within the Ministry of the Merchant
Fleet, Morcontainer, was established. Among its duties, this
department is responsible for the planning of container movement,
world-wide trading and control of the approximately 100,000 twenty
foot equivalent units (TEUs) owned by the fleet and coordinating the
handling of transit containers crossing the USSR. 13
23
The most advanced shipboard cargo handling system are of little
value if the supporting shoreside facilities are operating with
outdated equipment. Accordingly, the most recent Five Year Plans have
given careful attention to the upgrading of the port infrastructure.
The most obvious improvements have occurred in the container handling
facilities. Since the 1973 commencement of operations in the USSR's
first container port in Nakhodka, some forty ports have received
14
container handling equipment. However, advanced cargo systems have
also been built for the more efficient movement of grain, coal, lumber
and petroleum products. A variety of other port improvement measures.
such as the building of new wharves and warehouses. have been
undertaken to increase cargo handling capabilities throughout the
country.
The Soviet merchant marine entered the period of the twelfth
Five Year Plan (1986-1990) as one of the most competitive fleets in
the world. Table Five provides the composition of that fleet. The
maritime goals of the twelfth Five Year Plan involve continued
improvement to the quality and productivity of the merchant marine.
Specifically the plan indicates. "The work volume of the oceangoing
cargo fleet will grow by 5.5%. The entire increase in shipments will
be ensured through growth in the fleet's productivity. without
increasing its tonnage.,,15 In contrast to the emphasis of earlier
plans on adding tonnage. the twelfth Five Year Plan has as its goal.
To update the fleet, reinforcing it with highly productive and
economical speciali?ed ships •••• To increase the volume of
freight shipped in containers and unitized loads and on
lighter-en-board shipsIgnd ferries. To increase the efficiency of
foreign trade cargoes.
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TABLE FIVE
COMPOSITIOt-T OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT FLEET
AS OF JANUARY 1, 1985*
Dwt Tons
No. (in Thousands)
Freighters
General Cargo Carriers
Container Ships
Partial Container Ships
Roll-on/Roll-off Ships
Barge Carriers
Combination Passenger & Cargo Ships
Bulk Carriers
Tankers
Total
1,620
79
59
42
9
45
203
474
2,531
9,715
736
487
447
126
105
4,532
7,727
23,875
* Oceangoing ships of 1,000 gross tons and over.
Source: U.S., Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration,
Merchant Fleets of the World, as of January 1, 1985
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), pp.
6-7, 10-11.
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As the emphasis on fleet productivity grows, it is certain that the
Soviet merchant marine, now theoretically in pursuit of bona fide
commercial profit, will seek to maximize efficiency in every aspect of
its operation.
The phenomenal growth of the merchant fleet is a testin~nial to
the ability of a centrally directed economy to marshal its resources
to achieve an economic objective. At the same time, it must be noted
that this system has produced an enormous bureaucracy with all the
drawbacks inherent in such an organization. Resistance to change,
bureaucratic territoriality and voluminous quantities of paperwork are
just some of the difficulties encountered in the Soviet system.
Premier Gorbachev's policy of glasnost (openness) has enabled
Westerners to observe examples of these difficulties. Pravda, for
instance, discussed the lack of coordination between transportation
organizations,
Unfortunately, our country does not have a unified set of laws
governing transport, but instead has separate railroad, maritime,
motor vehicle, inland shipping and flying regulations, as well as
separate shipping rules, none of which are coordinated.
The 30-year-old regulations for shipping goods using combined
types of traDsportation contain many outdated provisions.
Departmentalism is sometimes carried to the point of absurdity.
Freight cars, ships anrl hoisting cranes sit idle due to the fact
that railroad workers, seamen and river workerv quibble over whose
weigher or shipping-and-I~ceivingclerk should affix the seal and
recalculate the freight.
The increased Soviet awareness of operational efficiency seems certain
to rectify problems like this; yet, it 1s comforting to know that
people~ and bureaucracies, are, in many ways, alike the world over.
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CHAPTER III
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET MERCPJU{T MARINE
<
Merchant shipping, which is a branch of production with a
maximum foreign economic orientation, cannot but reflect the
competition of the different socio-economic systems. It reacts
with great sensitiv:1.ty to the development of conflicting politicsl
processes resulting from the opposition the developed ca~italist
countries offer to the struggle against neo-colonialism.
T1mofei Guzhenko Minister of the l-ferchant Fleet (1970-1986)
Minister Guzhenko's comments reflect the incisive understanding
the Soviets have displayed since the mid-1950s of the critical role
merchant shipping can play in the execution of foreign policy. In the
years since Khrushchev's rise to power, the USSR has preven quite
adept at employing its merchant fleet in the pursuit of policy
objectives. The merchant marine has been an effective political
instrument both in the support of allies and in influencing
non-aligned nations. Its status as a state owned enterprise has
allowed its employment in matters outside the commercial interests of
101estern shipping companies.
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In the period
immediately following the end of World War Two, the primary concern of
Stalin and the Soviet government was with the economic recovery of the
USSR. In order to focus the resources of its recently acquired
satellites behind this effort, the Soviet Union established the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949. The CMEA
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initially consisted of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and
Czechoslovakia in addition to the USSR. In 1950, following the
conclusion of peace negotiations and its emergence as a state, East
Germany was "permitted" to join. Theoretically organized for the
mutual economic recovery and benefit of all member nations, CMEA, in
reality, was little more than a thinly veiled vehicle for Soviet
exploitation of Eastern Europe. Raw materials and manufactured goods
not otherwise available in the Soviet Union were provided to the USSR
at exorbitantly low prices. Poland, for example, was required to
provide coal at $1 - $1.50 a ton when the average world price was
$13.50 to $15. 2
In terms of shipping, the Soviet Union directed the CMEA member
states to provide merchant ships while its own shipyards concentrated
on rebuilding the Navy. Stalin provided a ready indication of the
USSR's principal maritime concern on July 28, 1945 when he announced,
"The Soviet People wish to see their fleet grow still stronger and
more powerful. Our people are constructing new battleships and bases
for the fleet.,,3 Thus, the task of rebuilding the merchant fleet fell
to the East Europeans, primarily the Poles and East Germans.
Ambitious shipbuilding goals were assigned these nations under the
CMEA pretext of mutual benefit and development.
With the intention of more effectively coordinating the shipping
operations of the CMEA, in February 1952 the Conference of Chartering
and Shipowning Organizations was established within the structure of
the Council. Initially concerned only with coordinating the
chartering activities of the CMEA, representatives of the shipping
4
companies began participating in the conference beginning in 1963.
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While the theoretical goal of mutual development continued to be
espoused, the USSR's policy of exploitation persisted. In 1952, for
example, shipments to the Soviet Union accounted for the following
percentages of ~rnA country exports: Poland - 32, Hungary - 29,
5C7.echoslovakia - 35, East Germany - 48, Romania - 58, Bulgaria - 57.
The death of Stalin coupled with the increasing rancor within the
satellite nations finally led the Soviet Union to change the nature of
the CMEA into one of bona fide mutual assistance. Although the USSR
clearly retained its position as the dominant country in the Council
and continued to seek the economic dependence of CMEA countries on
itself, the Soviets did make concessions for the development of the
other member states. In shipbuilding, for instance, the Soviets
relaxed the overly ambitious production schedules that had been
assigned, particularly in Poland and East Germany, and agreed to a
fixed profit structure for ships de1ivered. 6
Merchant shipping aided the USSR's pursuit of foreign policy
objectives within the socialist sphere of influence by providing a
framework within CMEA for the integration of economic effort by its
satellites. The purely exploitive nature of the organization was
replaced by a genuine effort at seeking mutual benefit. In 1956 an
agreement was signed which directed the specialization of shipbuilding
among the various members. Series production of vessels commenced and
the widely varying assortment of ships within CMEA was reduced to
several standardized ship types. Additionally, selection of ship
7designs was coordinated among all member states. The 1958 meetings
of the Council addressed the issue of integration of transport
efforts. At these meetings, the CMEA developed its plan for the
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commencement of regular shipping service between the member nations.
Further, the plan called for improvements to port infrastructure and
8harbor dredging in all the states.
Within the CMEA bureaucracy, a working group on transport was
established in 1961 to completely analyze the varying needs of the
members with regard to cargo carriage. Working in conjunction with
the Conference of Chartering and Shipowning Organi7.ations and the
various shipping companies, the maritime needs and integration goals
of the organi7.ation were addressed. In October 1962, the working
group was made a permanent section of the CMEA and tasked with the
9
coordination of five year transport development plans. Closer
integration of maritime assets and coordination of shipping lines and
routes were the results of these measures.
The document which serves as the foundation upon which the CMEA
functions in its current capacity is the 1971 Comprehensive Program
for the Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the
Development of Socialist Economic Integration. The merchant marine
was one of the areas immediately addressed as a likely avenue of
greater coordination under this program. Accordingly, on December 3,
1971 the CMEA countries completed an Agreement on Cooperation in
10Merchant Shipping. Further coordination in transport matters was
sought through the 1976 Guidelines for Cooperation in the Transport
Field and the Long Term Specific Programs for Cooperation in
11Developing Transport Links, concluded in 1979.
Merchant shipping has clearly played an important role for the
Soviet Union in the pursuit of its policy objectives within Eastern
Europe. After initially utilizing the CMEA for the unadulterated
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exploitation of its satellites, the USSR allowed the organization to
evolve into one of mutual economic benefit. In this capacity,
maritime matters have been of pivotal significance. Shipbuilding
orders helped restore the industrial base of Eastern Europe; maritime
trade promoted specialization within the Council; and coordinated
shipping and chartering efforts increased the efficiency and
profitability of fleet operations. Although the CMEA countries no
longer dominate the USSR's trade statistics to the extent they once
did, they still playa major role. constituting 54.9 percent of Soviet
12foreign trade. Within the socialist sphere of influence. merchant
shipping has unequivocally enabled the USSR to strengthen the
political and economic bonds of the CMEA.
Support for Allies. The merchant marine has also prOVided the
Soviet Union with the means to provide assistance to its distant
socialist allies. Nowhere is this more evident than in the USSR's
support of Cuba. Since 1960, over 57 billion roubles worth of trade
has been carried between the two countries, virtually all of it by
13
sea. The rise of Castro's revolutionary regime brought with it
sharply increased demands upon Soviet shipping. In response to Cuban
nationalization of foreign owned oil refineries, Western oil companies
severed the island's supply of crude oil. The USSR, virtually
overnight, became Cuba's sole source of crude oil. The island's
demands, at that time approximately 4.5 million tons annually,
14
severely strained the Soviet Union's tanker capabilities.
Supply of the USSR's first Western Hemisphere socialist ally
became a major political objective for the Soviet government.
Ideology, rather than commercial concerns, predominated as the
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Soviets, their own tanker capacity exceeded by the new demands, sought
to charter vessels on the tanker market. Western oil companies, still
enraged by the loss of their Cuban facilities, attempted to organize a
boycott. Although the effort ultimately proved futile, it did succeed
in raising Soviet charter rates up to twenty nine percent above the
15
norm. However, the vital political significance of this effort far
outweighed its costs to the Soviets. Minister of the Merchant Fleet
Victor Bakaev affirmed the political role of the fleet in 1965:
Economic criteria, however, important as they are, still do not
reveal fully the significance of the merchant fleet to the Soviet
government. During the course of the Seven Year Plan the merchant
fleet of the USSR carried out a series of responsible tasks for
the Communist Party and the Soviet government, which were not only
economic, but also political in character. Paramount among these,
it should be emphasized, was the participation in the breaking of
the military-political and trade-ecoygmic blockade of Cuba
established by American imperialism.
The Soviet Union' 8 experience :f.n its logistical support of Cuba
substantiated the importance of the merchant fleet, particularly in
the execution of political requirements. The expansion of the Soviet
fleet enabled the USSR to increase the flow of trade and aid to its
ally. Soviet merchant ships now call at Cuban ports approximately
171,200 times a year. Trade with the USSR constitutes over 70 percent
18
of the Cuban turnover (exports and imports). As illustrated in
Table Six, the Soviet Union continues to ship enormous quantities of
oil, machinery and other industrial commodities to Cuba to insure the
economic vitality of its distant satellite.
In a manner similar to its support of Cuba, the USSR has
assisted Vietnam in its ongoing economic development. Now a member,
along with Cuba, of CHEA, Vietnam has received large quantities of
Soviet aid by ocean transport. Indicative of the Soviet Union's
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TABLE SIX
SOVIET TRADE WITH CUBA DURING THE TENTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (1976-1980)
Soviet Exports to Cuba
1.5 billion roubles of oil
1.7 billion roubles of machinery/industrial equipment
51 million roubles of iron
248 million roubles of rolled products
142 million roubles of tractors
3.8 million tons of fertilizer
2 million cubic meters of lumber
1.8 million tons of flour
Soviet Imports from Cuba
434 million roubles of nickel-cobalt concentrate
13.6 million tons of raw sugar
3.4 million decaliters of rum
7.7 million cigarettes
224 thousand tons of citrus fruit
Source: N.V. Zinov'yev, "The Dynamics of Trade Ties," Soviet Press
Selected Translations, July-August 1983, p. 155.
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concern for its ally, and further evidence of the political importance
of the merchant marine, was the establishment of LASH service to
19Vietnam from Eastern Europe's Danube ports. As critical as merchant
shipping support currently is to Vietnam, its efforts during the war
with the United States were essential for the continuation of the
conflict. While enjoying immunity from attack themselves, Soviet
ships were able to carry supplies vital for the war effort into
Haiphong. During 1969, for example, Soviet merchant ships made 435
voyages to the North Vietnamese port city, delivering a wide variety
20
of war materials. As demonstrated in Cuba, and again iu Vietnam,
the merchant marine furnishes the Soviet government with the means to
achieve its political objectives by providing support to its socialist
allfcs throughout the world.
Third World Policy Objectives. In the years immediately
following World War Two, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was
primarily focused on solidifying Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.
Due to this overriding concern, little was achieved in extending the
USSR's influence beyond the socialist sphere. In Stalin's view of the
world, those countries that were not socialist allies were to be
considered enemies, with no ideological place for neutrals. Following
the death of Stalin, Khrushchev's rise to power brought with it
sweeping changes in Soviet perceptions of the world's political
alignments. To Khrushchev, the end of colonialism and the emergence of
uewly independent states represented an opportunity to expand Soviet
influence while weakening Western economic and political ties.
Further, Khrushchev envisioned economic gains to be made by
establishing trade with these nations.
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Khrushchev attempted to utilize the intense nationalism of the
new states as a means of alienating them from their former colonial
rulers. Declaring that the West was practicing neocolonialism by
maintaining the economic dependence of the underdeveloped states,
Khrushchev offered the assistance of the Soviet Unlon and its allies
as an alternative. In his report to the Central Committee of the CPSU
at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev elaborated on his
view of world politics.
The winning of political freedom by the peoples of the former
colonies and semi-colonies is the first and most important
prerequisite of their full independence, that is, of the
achievement of economic independence ••• These countries,
although they do not belong to the socialist world system, can
draw on its achievements to build up an independent national
economy and to raise the living standards of their peoples. Today
they need not go begging for up-to-date equipment to their former
oppressors. They can get it in the socialist countries, without
assuming any political or military commitments.
The very fact that the Soviet Union and the other countries of
the socialist camp exist, their readiness to help the
underdeveloped countries in advancing their industries on terms of
equality and mutual benefit, are major stumbling blocks to
colonial policy. The imperialists can no longer regard the
underdeveloped c~yntries soley as potential sources for making
maximum profits.
In contrast to Stalin's "friend or foe" approach to foreign
policy, Khrushchev espoused a vast "peace zone" consisting of both
socialist and non-socialist states. The foreign policy of the Soviet
Union set the courting of these non-socialist states as a principal
objective. In order to accomplish this, the USSR established a
program of technical assistance, economic and military aid and
expanded trade. With the initiation of this program in 1955, the
demands on, and importance of, the Soviet merchant fleet grew
dramatically. The USSR's global trade turnover (exports and imports),
for example, more than doubled by 1962 while trade with less developed
22
states increased fourfold (see Table Seven). The intensified
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TABLE SEVEN
EXPANSION OF SOVIET GLOBAL TRADE TURNOVER 1955-1962
Percent
1955 1962 IncreaGe
Total Trade Turnover* (exports and imports) 6,488 13,485 207.8
With Communist countries 5,142 9,472 184.2
With East Europe 3,455 7,559 218.8
With non-Communist countries 1.346 4,013 298.1
Developed areas 974 2,370 243.4
Less developed areas 372 1,643 441. 7
* tn millions of dollars
Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, The Growing
Strength of the Soviet Merchant Fleet, by Leon M. Herman
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), p.6.
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requirements for the fleet highlighted its shortcomings and ultimately
led to the massive shipbuilding effort of the Seven Year Plan. The
fundamental shift in Soviet post-war foreign policy and the
unprecedented expansion of the merchant marine are thus inexorably
linked.
The spectacular increase in Soviet trade with less developed nations
proved to be of enormous benefit to the USSR. After years of subservience
to Western colonial powers. many newly independent countries viewed the
Soviet Union as a viable alternative to continued dependence on their
former masters. For its part. the USSR stressed its concern for the
development and true independence of these lands as contrasted with the
alleged economic exploitation practiced by the West. Favorable trade
terms. including reduced shipping rates on Soviet merchant ships. were
designed to reinforce this belief while expanding the USSR's influence.
Of course. with increased trade relations came the requirement for Soviet
consular representatives. trade organizations and shipping personnel to
establish their presence in these nations. The Third World political
foothold and economic penetration desired by the Soviet Union was thus
achieved.
Soviet diplomatic efforts in the Third World achieved their initial
success in February 1955 with the signing of an agreement with India for
the construction of a million ton steel mill in the Bhilai region. 23
This project. and subsequent construction efforts in various
underdeveloped nations, provided the USSR with the opportunity to
demonstrate its industrial might and technical sophistication. The role
of the merchant fleet was in keeping with this objective. Employed to
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carry construction materials, industrial equipment and Soviet technicians,
the ships of the merchant marine contributed to the favorable image of the
USSR.
During portcalls to less developed states, the national prestige of
the Soviet Union was enhanced by both the merchant ships and their
sailors. Smart, modern ships provide an outstanding testimonial to Soviet
industrial and technological excellence. Proper conduct ashore is
constantly stressed to the crews of merchant ships. In contrast to the
normal image of sailors on liberty, Soviet merchantmen are expected to be
well behaved while ashore. As described in Pravda, these sailors are
thoroughly briefed before leaving their ships.
All ships are regularly supplied with po Lf.t Lca.L review materials.
And before the ship sets sail, there are invariably political
instruction sessions that include all sorts of measures: lectures,
discussions on a number of problems that could arise on "the opposite
shore" and a detaile~4analysis of the political and economic situation
in the port of call.
The favorable image of its merchant ships and crews increases Soviet
national prestige and is of considerable benefit to the conduct of
diplomatic efforts by the USSR.
In addition to its role in trade and economic aid programs, the
Soviet merchant fleet was extensively employed in arms shipments. The
USSR's effort to expand its political influence through the provision of
military supplies began with the sale of $250 million worth of armaments
to Egypt in 1955. 25 Since that first shipment, Soviet arms transfers have
been made throughout the Middle East, Asia and Africa. In fact, by 1984
the Soviet Union was the world's leading exporter of arms, delivering $9.~
26billion of armaments, of which $8.6 billion went to developing states.
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Because of the sensitive nature of the cargo, it is obvious that
these military shipments have required the use of Soviet merchant ships.
Thus, the merchant marine was at the center of several triumphs of Soviet
foreign policy. Military aid to Egypt ultimately led to the establishment
of naval facilities in Alexandria and expanded Soviet military and
political presence and influence throughout the Arab world. Similar
advances were made in Syria, Yemen, Ethiopia, Somolia and a score of other
nations where Soviet merchant ships called with military aid shipments.
In this role, the Soviet Union's merchant fleet repeatedly demonstrated
i t s usefulness as an instrument of state policy.
The merchant marine has been a key element in Soviet post-war
foreign policy. In contrast with its strictly profit oriented Western
counterparts, the Soviet Union's merchant fleet has prOVided the
government with a most effective tool in the pursuit of political aims.
In expanding its influence, both within the socialist sphere and beyond,
the Soviet Union has effectively utilized its merchant marine to gain
maximum advantage. Still greater cooperation and coordination remains 8
Soviet goal for the CHEA, and employment of the fleet remains central to
this. Khrushchev's emphasis on trade and aid programs with developing
nations continues to be a centerpiece of the Soviet Union's foreign
policy. Evidence of this is provided in the twelfth Five Year Plan
(1986-1990) which calls for the USSR, "To deepen cooperation with the
developing countries •••• To continue the consistent implementation of
coordinated long term programs of trade, economic, scientific and
27technical ties with these countries." As in the past~ it may be
expected that the Soviet Union will make shrewd use of its merchant marine
to secure its political objectives.
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CHAPTER IV
SOVIET MERCHANT FLEET ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
The Soviet merchant marine. which is an important branch of the
national economy. is called on to ensure economies and to reduce
hard-currency expenditures by substantially increasing the shipping of
exports and imports on Soviet ships.
The existence of a merchant marine of our own that provides a
capability of this sort is of considerable importance to the
development of foreign trade ayd to the achievement of independence
from the world freight market.
First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Yu. Brezhnev
The modification of Soviet foreign policy following the death of
Stalin was of tremendous importance to the merchant marine. The USSR's
program of expanded trade relations throughout the world and the
implementation of aid programs with underdeveloped nations placed enormous
demands on the merchant fleet. As Table Eight illustrates, the sharply
increased Soviet foreign trade requirements quickly outstripped the
carrying capacity of the fleet. As a result. the USSR was forced to
charter foreign ships until her massive ship construction effort could
increase the size of the merchant fleet. The percentage of Soviet trade
carried in her own bottoms dropped markedly during this period while
expenditures for ship charters taxed an already scarce supply of hard
cur.rency. As a consequence. the economics of merchant shipping became a
subject of considerable interest in Moscow.
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TABLE EIGHT
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE 1950-1965
Percent
Total Seaborne Percent Trade Carried Carried By
Trade Trade* Seaborne by Soviet Ships* Soviet Ships
1950 30.2 8.3 27 5.9 72
1958 69.6 26.6 38 14.6 55
1960 99.3 44.3 45 18.2 41
1962 132.9 66.9 50 24.8 37
1965 173.9 91.8 53 46.4 50
* in millions of tons
Source: Robert E. Athay, The Economics of Soviet Merchant-Shi
(Chapel Rill: The University of North Carolina Press,
p. 9.
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Reduction of Dependence on Western Shipping. The USSR's experience
in resolving Cuba's oil needs provided the Soviet government with ample
evidence of the critical importance of the merchant marine in both its
political and economic capacities. As a less developed nation which had
turned to the Soviet Union for assistance, Cuba was of vital political
importance for the Soviets. To the USSR, Cuba represented an opportunity
to demonstrate the ability of the socialist bloc to support a less
developed ally. Cuba's oil requirements. in particular, became the focal
point of this issue. However. the attempted tanker embargo by Western oil
companies threatened the endeavor and called attention to the Soviet
Union's own shipping weaknesses. Although the Soviets were eventually
able to charter suffi.cient tankers, due to the oil companies' action, it
was at significantly higher than normal rates. This, as a result, reduced
the Soviets' reserves of hard currency still further. Thus, the USSR
became determined to reduce its dependence on Western shipping.
Chartering of foreign ships presented a problem to the Soviet Union
in the 19506 and 1960s because of the outlay of hard currency jt entailed
and the inhibiting role it played with Soviet policy plans. As the
accelerated ship construction programs reached fruition, the Soviet Union
was able to carry ever increasing quantities of its own cargo.
Nevertheless, although the USSR sought independence from Western shipping,
this was not meant to imply a goal of total cargo carriage by Soviet
ships. Shrewdly, merchant marine planners recognized the economic utility
in making some cargo available in the interest of securing joint shipping
arrangements. Additionally, as noted in Seatrade magazine, "By
limiting investment in its own dry cargo fleet - which in any case is of
much less military value than, say, the Soviet liner fleet - it can con-
centrate cn getting the best deal possible using other oWP.ers' tonnage.,,2
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The Soviets continue to make some cargo available for foreign
shipping concerns since it is in their long term interest from both a
shipbuilding and trade relations perspective. According to Soviet
statistics, foreign ships carried 94.7 million tons of the USSR's
international trade in 1985, constituting 41 percent of the total seaborne
3
cargo carriage. Of course, Western ship operators are quick to point out
that most of this is lower value bulk cargo. Trade statistics indicate
that as much as 96 percent of the higher value Soviet liner cargo is
4
carried by the USSR's o~~ fleet. The Soviet Union's merchant marine has
developed to the point where, barring unforeseen circumstances, the
country is economically dependent on foreign shipping only to the extent
it allows. The president of Sovfracht, the USSR's chartering agency,
explained the Soviet reasoning behind this decision,
The size of the Soviet merchant marine and its composition reflect
in the first place the requirements of the national economy. Insofar
as the national foreign trade is concerned, the national merchant
marine has always been geared to carry about 45 to 55 percent of same,
thus being safe from any possible reductions in the volume of foreign
trade and avoiding over-investment in merchant m3rine as well as the
consequential drama of laying up excess tonnage.
Thus, for both political and economic reasons, the Soviets continue to
make a portion of their overseas trade available for carriage by foreign
ships.
Acquisition of Hard Currency. As the m6rchant fleet grew, the
Soviet Union was quick to employ its ships for the acquisition of Western
hard currency. During the winter months, when severe weather and icing in
the USSR's northern ports reduced shipping requirements, the Soviets
chartered many vessels out to foreign shippers. Furthermore, after
delivering exports, ships returniug to the Soviet Union sought foreign
cargo in order to utili7.e any available carrying capacity and earn
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additional hard currency. In 1965, Soviet lines entered the cross trade
market. 6 The cross trades, which is the carr:i.age of cargo by a ship frotn
other than the two trading ne.t.Lons , provided the Soviets with the
opportunity to maximize hard currency earnings.
The emergence of a powerful Soviet merchant marine was cause for
considerable consternation among Western shipping interests. Accustomed
to the well-ordered world of conferences and stable shipping rates, the
aggressive Soviet penetration of international sea commerce caused virtual
panic among liner operators in the West. When the USSR first entered the
market, its ships were smaller, slower and less sophisticated than those
of the Western lines it was competing against. Therefore, in order to
secure a position in the market, the Soviets correctly concluded that they
must compete on price. Offering rates substantially below those of the
conferences, the Soviet Union's merchant fleet succeeded in expanding into
the liner trades.
As they endeavored to enlarge fleet operations, Soviet shipping
personnel demonstrated a business acumen worthy of a true capitalist.
Freight forwarders, the middlemen who actually make the shipping arrange-
ments for their merchant clients, were offered higher brokerage by the
Soviet lines, in some cases as much as four times higher than conference
7lines. As liner operations expanded, overseas shipping subsidiaries were
established and respected local shipping personnel hired to represent the
Soviet companies. The USSR's merchant fleet rapidly proved itself to be a
competitive force to be reckoned with. In its study, The Soviet Merchant
Marine: Economic and Strategic Challenge to the West, the Atlantic
Council assessed the Soviet organizational strategy as, "••• a textbook
8
example of how to be successful in the shipping business.
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As the Soviet companies began to enjoy some success on the
traditionally Western routes, capitalist shipping interests attempted to
counter the threat posed by these intruders. Charges of predatory rate
cutting by the Soviets were raised by Western shipowners who cited
examples of rates as much as forty percent below conference standards.
For their part, the Soviets claimed that members of various conferences
rebated shippers greater amounts than they provided by the cut rate. 9 In
reality, rate cutting was a relatively common method for an outsider to
compete with conference members. The Soviets consistently employed this
tactic to gain entry into trade routes. Although there were instances of
Soviet lines cutting rates by forty percent, these were generally isolated
cases not indicative of standard Soviet practice. As to the countercharge
of rebating, the Federal Maritime Commission determined that this measure
10had, in fact, become common in some conferences.
Despite the charges and countercharges, the Soviets continued to
aggressively pursue their goal of earning hard currency through liner
market penetration. Western critics, alarmed by Soviet success, predicted
catastrophe for Free World shipping companies. These observers, although
far from unbiased in their assessments, did call attention to several
factors which favored the Soviet fleet. Rate cutting, as the Soviet Union
was quick to point out, was a common tactic employed by a shipping company
operating outside the conference system. However, most independent lines
were not state owned enterprises, secure in the financial backing of the
controlling government. Thus, Western operators feared that the Soviets
could sustain losses far longer than a commercial company. Since shippers
would pressure the conference for lower rates to match the Soviet fleet's.
the USSR's rate cutting measures threatened to play havoc with conference
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lines. The result of the Soviet tactic was thus to either attract cargo
for their own ships or force the conferences to lower their rates.
Western shipping companies also claimed that the Soviet Union's
merchant marine was able to operate at cost levels far below those of the
capitalist countries. Among the advantages attributed to the Soviet fleet
were lower crew wages, no requirement for hull or machinery insurance,
substantially cheaper bunkers provided in their homeports and the unique
cost accounting system of the Soviet Union in such matters as construction
and depreciation costs. Charges of unfair Soviet competit:ion have not
abated in the more than twenty years since their entrance into the liner
trades. In January 1987, American Shipper maga?ine discussed the
criticisms made of the Soviet company Morflot Freight Lines, Ltd for its
activity in Montreal's container trade. One shipping company executive
stated, "We don't mind competing with anyone, but we have some problems
with competition that is not in the free enterprise system," while another
11
referred to the Soviet system as "different economics." Citing crew
costs as a major Soviet advantage, a Lloyd's of London Press study was
utilized to provide illustration. Soviet crew costs for a 350 TED
container ship were estimated as $140,000 annually. By comparison, a
similar ship manned by British officers and a Chinese crew would cost
$800,000 while expenses for a U.S. flag vessel were estimated at
12$1,200,000.
For their part, the Soviets continued to employ whatever methods
necessary to achieve their ultimate objective - the earning of foreign
currency. After their initial attempts to join several conferences were
rebuffed, the USSR operated in direct competition with these organizations
on the most lucrative routes. Subsequent efforts by the conferences to
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encourage the Soviets to join were accepted only when they felt it would
be economically advantageous to do so. Otherwise, the Soviet Union chose
to operate outside the conference system. It should be noted that once
admitted to a conference, the USSR has fully complied with all conference
requirements. This again reflects sound economic decision-making since
Soviet ships are then able to sail with cargo at the higher conference
rates.
Trans-Siberian Railroad. The Soviet Union was slow to adopt the
sophisticated cargo handling technology of the container revolution.
However, once the extraordinary economic advantages of this system were
appreciated by the Soviets, they moved rapidly to introduce
containerization into their merchant fleet. Aside from the increased
productivity of their ships, the container system provided the USSR with
another means of earning hard currency. Through their observation of
Western application of containerization, particularly the development of
the land-bridge concept in the United States, the Soviets recognized the
tremendous economic potential of the Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR).
Formally inaugurated in 1904 by Emperor Nicholas II, the TSR was first
utilized for container shipment in 1970. During that year, the TSR
handled only 200 TEUs. However, indicative of relentless Soviet
determination to develop this form of technology, by 1976 the TSR was
carrying 120,000 TEUs. 13
The TSR stretches from the Soviet Pacific ports of Vladivostok,
Nakhodka and Vostochny across the USSR to the western railroad hub at
Moscow (Map Two). At the hub, railways extend to the Soviet Union's
western port cities as well as into Western Europe. While the
Trans-Siberian Railroad and its northern addition, the Baikal-Amur
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Mainline, clearly serve the Soviet plans for development of the USSR's
eastern regions, its attractiveness to shippers is readily apparent. Use
of the TSR, extending 13,000 kilometers from the Far East, offers shippers
considerable savings when compared to the 21,000 kilometer sea voyage via
the Suez Canal or the 27,000 kilometer journey around the Cape of Good
14Hope. The Soviets are thus able to tap this additional source in their
quest for hard currency earnings.
Cruise Ship Operations. Given the economic importance of Western
currency earnings to the USSR, it was inevitable that the Soviets would
recognize the usefulness of cruise ships in their merchant fleet.
Commencing in the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union made a determined effort to
enter the cruise trades. Utilizing CMEA-built ships in addition to
vessels purchased from unprofitable Western lines, the Soviet Union has
assembled a fleet of 87 ships which serve 11 international trades as well
15
as over 100 domestic lines. Cruise ships provide the USSR with the
opportunity to earn hard currency from both the carriage of foreign
passengers directly and the chartering of Soviet liners to Western
agencies. Although not a direct economic benefit, the national prestige
of the USSR is enhanced by modern, well-run passenger ships.
Operations of Soviet cruise ships have paralleled those of the carBo
vessels. Morpasflot, the organization responsible for Soviet passenger
shipping, established agencies throughout the world to attract tourists.
Partnerships were formed with foreign companies in order to arrange
cruises aboard Soviet ships. Echoing the complaints of their cargo
carrying counterparts, Western passenger ship operators raised charges of
rate cutting and unfair competition. Soviet actions during the Falklands
War were indicative of their opportunism in this trade. With the
commandeering of the British passenger ships Queen Elizabeth 2 and
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Canberra for the transport of troops, the Soviets took advantage of this
opportunity to raise their share of the British cruise market from ten
16percent to forty two percent. As in the liner trades, the Soviet
shrewdly employed their assets to maximi7e their economic gain.
Arctic Development. The Soviet merchant marine has played an
equally important, although certainly less dramatic, economic role 111 its
domestic applications. In 1985, for example, the fleet was employed in
17the carriage of 84.4 million tons of domestic cargo. Although clearly
of major significance to the Soviet economy in this capacity, the domain
in which the USSR's merchant fleet is certain to have its greatest impact
is in the planned year round use of the Northern Sea Route. The Soviet
Union has identified Siberia and the Far East as the areas upon which its
continued economic growth will depend. Extraction of the resources of
these regions will rely heavily upon the merchant fleet.
The development of Siberia and the Far East was identified by the
lwenty Seventh Party Congress as a matter of national priority. The
importance of these regions to the future growth of the Soviet Union
cannot be overstated. The abundant raw materials of the area will become
essential to the economic vitality of the country. The nirector of the
Economics Research Institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, V.
Chichkanov, provided a measure of the resources available in the Arctic in
Pravda, liThe areas north of the Arctic Circle contain about 40% of our
country's mineral resources and raw-materials." l B Regarding the Far East,
he stated,
Extensive mineral, raw-material and biological resources constitute
the foundation of the Far East's economic development. These
resources can meet a large portion of the country's needs for a number
of products. The region accounts for a considerable share of the
country's fish catch and one-seventh of its fur production. It also
produces timber, gold, silver, zinc, lead and tin.
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Even so, improved exploration indicates that there is enormous
untapped potential, including deposits of ferrous, nonferrous and
precious metals, mineral fertilizers, building materials, coal,
petroleum, natural gas Bnd large reserves of geothermal energy.
The region contains 26% of the country's timber reserves, and fish
resources in the USSR's 200 mile zone in the Far East are estjmated
at 23 mil ion ton~9 The economic development of the Far East has
only just begun.
The distinctive geographic features of the Siberian ccuntryside have
placed the onus of developing this region almost entirely on the merchant
marine. As depicted in Map Three, the rivers of Siberia flow in a
northerly direction towards the Arctic rather than towards the population
centers of the west. Accordingly, aside from the relatively minor use of
the Trans-Siberian Railroad, development of Siberia hinges on the
utilization of merchant shipping in the Arctic. Recognition of the
importance of maritime transport in the Northern regions is not a recent
occurrence. Since 1898, when they designed the world's first oceangoing
icebreaker, the Russians have sought to effectively utilize the Arctic for
20
shipping.
The Soviet government is able to trace its interest in Arctic
navigation to the period following the October Revolution. In 1920, the
Siberian Revolutionary Committee founded the Committee for the Northern
Sea Route. This organization was subsequently absorbed, in 1932, by the
Northern Sea Route Ad1!linistration which was "charged with developing the
Northern Sea Route from the White Sea to the Bering Strait, completely
I
equipping it, maintaining it in proper condition, and procuring the means
21to ensure the safety of navigation over the same." Ongoing Soviet
research of the Arctic began in 1937 with the establishment of drifting
22ice stations. By 1939, the Eighteenth Party Congress directed the
Northern Sea Route be made into a summer regular operating sea lane to the
23Far East.
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Map Three Soviet Arctic Region
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Interrupted by the Second World War, Soviet plans for the increased
use of the Northern Sea Route were renewed in the late 1940s. Despite
occasional setbacks, the USSR relentlessly pursued utilization of the
route. Ships designed specifically for operability in the Arctic were
built in the Soviet Union or ordered abroad. Soviet efforts were aided
enormously by the addition of the world's first nuclear powered surface
ship, the icebreaker Lenin, in 1959. By 1962, the employment of cargo
ships suited for Arctic operations. coupled with powerful icebreakers, had
24
extended the shipping season to almost five months.
The Soviets continued to press ahead with their development plans
for the Arctic, particularly in the area of ship design. The construction
of the Arktika (since renamed Leonid Brezhnev) provi.ded the USSR with the
world's largest and most powerful icebreaker. With an estimated
icebreaking capability of eight feet, Arktika class ships have produced
historic achievements in the Arctic Ocean. 25 The Arktika became the first
surface ship to reach the North Pole on August 17, 1977 after a journey of
262,528 miles through open water and pack ice. From May 25 to June 13,
1978, her sister ship, the Sibir, escorted a freighter along the Northern
Sea Route from Murmansk to the Chukchi Sea. This voyage, which occurred
two months before the normal navigation season, prOVided ample testimony
27to the extraordinary value of these ships.
Future shipbuilding plans call for the addition of more nuclear
powered vessels to take advantage of the unlimited range and endurance of
these ships. Of particular note is the construction of the Sevmorput, a
nuclear powered barge carrier. LASH technology is especially well suited
for employment on the Siberian rivers. Use of barges will greatly
enhance Soviet transport capability throughout the regi.on while reducing
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reliance on port facilities. Additionally. a new class of shallow draft.
nuclear powered icebreakers, the Taimyr class, will be constructed in
Finland with installation of the power plant to occur in the Soviet
Union. 28
While the Arctic has received considerable attention from merchant
marine planners and significant fleet progress in the region has already
been achieved. much remains to be accomplished. Complaints have been
raised in the Soviet press regarding the poorly developed ports, lack of
repair and maintenance facilities, disruptions in cargo deliveries and
lack of coordination between agencies. One critic noted. "The
unitized-load and container systems have been virtually forgotten in the
29Arctic. As a result. the fleet stands idle at quays for extra days."
Nevertheless, the critical importance of this area to the future economic
growth of the Soviet Union is certain to lead to the expeditious solution
of these problems. Soviet determination in seeking to develop the region
is reflected in the current Five Year Plan goal for the Murmansk Shipping
Company, "The plan for the Company's social and economic development in
1986-1990 and until 2000 stipulates the uninterrupted supply of cargo to
any spot on the Arctic coast or islands, regardless of whether equipped or
30
not. as well as bringing back local mining and production items."
The merchant fleet has been of unquestionable economic value to the
Soviet Union. The expansion of the merchant marine enabled the USSR to
satisfy its domestic and foreign shipping requirements. In this manner.
the Soviet Union was able to reduce its dependence on Western shipping
while stemming the loss of hard currency. As the fleet grew. the Soviets
aggressively employed it on the liner and cruise trades to earn Western
currency. Domestic utilization of the fleet on the Northern Sea Route
54
will enable the USSR to fully exploit the resources of the Far East and
Siberia, resources which will be of increasing importance in the years
ahead. Thus, the merchant marine has become an indispensable element of
Soviet economic planning and growth.
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CHAPTER V
MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT ~UffiINE
In the United States, the merchant marine is often called the
"fourth arm of defense." Merchant ships played a vital role in the
American war effort in both the Atlantic and Pacific during the Second
World War. Liberty ships, produced in virtual assembly line fashion,
formed the backbone of a supply effort that ultimately led to Allied
triumph. In Korea and, again, in Vietnam, merchant vessels carried
troops, ammunition and military equipment essential to the conduct of the
war. Despite the fact that its effort in World War Two did not require
support of this magnitude from its own ships, the Soviet Union did employ
its merchant fleet in support of military operations a8 well as receive
vital supplies from the Allies in the famed Murmansk convoys. The
military utility of the merchant fleet was a lesson that was not lost on
the Soviets.
Direct Naval Support. The merchant marine fulfills important
peacetime military functions in both direct and indirect support of the
Soviet Navy. The most visible use of merchant ships in support of the
Navy is as a supplement to the military logistics force. The Soviet ratio
of logistics ships to combatants of 1:42 (compared to a U.S. ratio of
11:15) is insufficient to conduct sustained operations at sea. In order
to alleviate the shortfall, merchant ships are utilized in repupply roles.
Soviet naval refueling and replenishment at sea by merchant ships is a
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common occurrence, particularly in distant operating areas. Merchant
vessels offer the additional advantage of being able to enter ports that
might prohibit military ships in order to procure fuel, food, water and
other essentials.
Another direct support mission for the merchant fleet is the
participation of these ships in Soviet naval exercises. During various
wargames, Soviet merchant ships have been observed carrying out their
presumed wartime functions. Okean-75 was a world-wide Soviet fleet
exercise in April 1975 involving over 200 naval vessels. Merchant ships
participated with amphibious forces in the Norwegian Sea and in convoy
defense exercises in the Pacific. 2 In a Warsaw Pact exercise (Zapad-B1)
in the eastern Baltic, Soviet ro-ro ships were utilized to transport Army
3troops and land them ashore. In 1983, approximately forty merchant ships
participated in an exercise in which the Soviet Navy practiced its tactics
4for defending convoys.
Indirect Support Roles. The global travels of merchant vessels make
them particularly valuable for intelligence gathering. This indirect
support function requires the merchant fleet to report sightings of
foreign military vessels and merchant ships as well as information on
atmospheric and oceanographic conditions. Routine port visits provide
opportunities to verify navigational information such as bottom depth,
channels and landmarks as well as to update charts. While inport, Soviet
merchant sailors can obtain information on the port infrastructure. In
that regard, Soviet naval officers have sailed aboard merchant ships in
order to gather additional information on ports not open to naval
5
vessels.
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As discussed in Chapter Three, Soviet merchant ships have been
utilized to carry military cargo in support of the USSR's allies. The
resupply of the North Vietnamese through the port of Haiphong enabled the
Communist forces to carryon their fight. Even after the United States
mined Haiphong harbor, Soviet ships were able to continue to deliver vital
supplies to their allies. Similarly, the Soviet Union has employed its
merchant fleet in sustaining military efforts in Angola and Ethiopia.
In both cases, the logistical support provided by the USSR has been
crucial to the continued existence of the Soviet backed government.
Wartime Employment. In the event of a war, the Soviet Union can be
expected to quickly transition its fleet from civilian to military
control. This would be facilitated by the merchant marine's centralized
computer tracking system in Moscow. Since all merchant ships are required
to report their position on a daily basis, naval authorities could reroute
the fleet as necessary to support military operations. Merchant marine
officers, who are also assigned rank in the naval reserve, can be expected
to execute those orders promptly.
With the commencement of hostilities, the suitability of the USSR's
merchant fleet for wartime operations will be evident. The Sovi~t
reliance on ro-ro ships would prove exceptionally useful in support of
military operations. The ro-ros are capable of carrying tanks, armored
personnel carriers, artillery and other wheeled and tracked vehicles to
the area of conflict. Even with little shoreside support, these ships
could land their cargo of military equipment quickly and without
difficulty. By using ro-ro ships, containers with needed supplies could
be easily driven off the ship on trailers. This contrasts sharply with
the Western container ships which are dependent on extensive cargo
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handling equipment for offloading evolutions. In a wartime scenario. port
facilities may be damaged or otherwise unavailable, rendering the Western
ships essentially useless.
For much the same reason. LASH ships are a valuable auxiliary to the
Navy. These ships are able to transport large quantities of equipment and
supplies pre-staged on barges to the area of military operations and
rapidly offload them. LASH ships are able to transfer up to 25.000 tons
6
of cargo in 13 hours. As in the case of ro-ros, barge carriers require
little or no support from shore. LASH ships offer the added advantage of
being able to conduct offloading at sea. Thus, the ships could remain out
of range of direct coastal defense positions while providing support for
amphibious forces.
The Soviet Union is capable of resupplying its forces in the event
port facilities are not available through the use of ro-ro and LASH
vessels. However, in areas where the equipment may be available, the
Soviets are fully prepared to take take advant8ge of the speed and
productiVity of containerization. The USSR's fleet of containerships is
capable of carrying virtually any type of military cargo on resupply
missions. The rapid turnaround of container ships is a decided advantage
in military operations.
Although the Soviets have certainly grasped the military
applicability of shipboard advanced cargo system. the versatility of
general cargo ships continues to make them important to naval planners.
These ships are equipped with their own cargo handling equipment and are
capable of operating anywhere in the world. Further, the unique
characteristics of some of these vessels enhance their military value.
The Poltava class, for example, is equipped with an extra long cargo hatch
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which allows the transport of aircraft or missiles. Available in great
numbers, these ships could form the backbone of the USSR's military
logistics operations.
Aside from its cargo carrying role, the Soviet merchant marine is
capable of performing a number of other wartime military functions.
Passenger ships could be converted in order to transport large numbers of
troops. The intelligence gathering capacity of merchant ships would be of
increased importance during wartime. On more exotic missions, these ships
could be used for mining operations, to block enemy harbor channels by
scuttling themselves or to destroy port facilities in "suicide" sabotage
missions.
The United States has demonstrated in several wars the critical
importance of the merchant marine to the conduct of sustained combat
operations. The Soviet Union has clearly understood the significance of
this capability for its merchant fleet. While the commercial interests of
American shipping companies have essentially dictated reliance on
containerships, the state owned Soviet fleet has continued to pay careful
attention to the military utility of its ships. Taking advantage of
modern technology where possible but alway~ paying heed to potential
wartime conditions, the USSR has fashioned a merchant marine which is
truly capable of functioning as a branch of national defense.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The large and increasing dedication of scarce Soviet resources to
the growth of the Soviet merchant fleet is probably the best testament to
its ability to serve complement,ry economic, political, and strategic
objectives of the Soviet Union.
Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Soviet }~ritime Challenge
The merchant marine has been a powerful and effective policy
instrument for the Soviet government. The fleet's expansion has been of
incalculable benefit to the USSR which has employed it in an enterprising
and insightful manner. The growth of the merchant marine, from its
virtual destruction in World War Two to its position today as one of the
foremost fleets in the world, represents a triumph of Soviet planning and
determination. This paper has attempted to analyze the Seviet fleet and
the obj ectives which spurred its growth , As a result of this study,
several conclusions may be reached.
Western countries did not appreciate the magnitude or the
significance of the Soviet drive for mar itime power. The reaction of Free
World shipping companies to the appearance of Soviet merchant ships as
competitors en the world's trade routes was one of shock and dismay.
Secure in the knowledge that the Soviet Union was strictly a land power,
shipping executives, as well as Western governments, ignored the stark
reality of Soviet merchant marine expansion for the comfort of an
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anachronous cliche. The fleet, which to Westerners had seemingly appeared
overnight, was actually the product of a lengthy and massive construction
effort. However, by failing to understand the Soviet Union's maritime
objectives, the West was unprepared for the aggressive employment of the
Soviet fleet as a legitimate competitor.
The genesis of the modern Soviet fleet can be traced directly to
Khrushchev's decision to expand trade and aid programs. Aside from the
indisputable economic benefits increased trade offered, these programs
provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to broaden its political
influence throughout the world. Decrying Western neocolonialism, the USSR
portrayed itself to the newly independent nations of the Third World as an
alternative to self-serving capitalist countries. Central to this
overture was the ability of the Soviet Union to meet the shipping demands
generated by these programs. This, then, was the impetus for the
development of the Soviet merchant fleet.
Just as political reasons were the cause for the growth of the
merchant marine, so too did they provide subsequent aims for its
employment. The USSR has been exceedingly skillful in utilizing its fleet
to achieve foreign policy objectives. As an instrument of the state,
rather than a strictly commercial enterprise, the merchant marine has been
adroitly manipulated to expand the influence and enhance the prestige of
the Soviet Union throughout the world. The fleet has also played a key
role in demonstrating Soviet support of its allies. The effectiveness of
the merchant marine in a political capacity has been of enormous benefit
to the government of the Soviet Union.
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The primary focus of Soviet economic motivation is Western hard
currency. Unable to use the rouble outside the socialist bloc, the USSR
must pay for imports from the West with hard currency. Thus, the
accumulation of this currency is a matter of national priority to the
Soviets. This concern explains the sense of urgency the merchant marine
expansion took on in the late 1950s anrl early 1960s. As a result of the
sharply increased shfpping demands of the new Soviet foreign policy, the
USSR was forced to charter ships from the West. This required the
expenditure of alarming amounts of hard currency. In order t o curtail
this loss, the Soviet Union embarked on an unprecedented build-up of its
merchant fleet. The ultimate aim of this program was to make the USSR
independent of Western shipping. When this was achieved, the Soviet Union
was able to execute its foreign policy programs without excessive loss of
hard currency.
Once sufficient shipping was acquired, the Soviets utilized their
fleet in the international liner trades to earn hard currency. In the
employment of their merchant marine, they have proven to be exceptionally
intelligent and aggressive businessmen. They have exploited every
opportunity and have been relentless in the pursuit of their economic
objective. ~lliile their tactics have not generally been as ruthless as
Western shipping companies claim, the Soviets are quick, nevertheless, to
maximize the advantages inherent in state ownership.
The key to the USSR's future econom1C growth is ~iberia and rar
East; the key to the development of these regions is the merchant marine.
Due to the geographical features of these areas, the carriage of raw
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materials from these lands to the population centers of the western USSR
must utilize the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic Ocean. The Soviet
Union has developed innovative methods to expand use of the route. The
merchant fleet has been at the forefront in adopting various technological
advances for employment in the north. The nuclear powered LASH ship,
Sovmorput, is an excellent example of Soviet ingenujty in the application
of advanced shipping technology to this area. With the growing value of
the Arctic region resources to the USSR, the domestic role of the merchant
fleet will be of critical importance to the economic well-being of the
nation.
The current emphasis on fleet efficiency is certain to continue for
the foreseeable future. Whether or not the new cost accounting system
reflects Western concepts of profit and loss, the shipping companies will
clearly be under pressure to more effectively manage their assets. The
stress on productivity and efficiency will no doubt be reflected in
increased numbers of specialized ships to be built for the Soviet fleet
and improvements to port infrastructure. LASH, ro-ro and container ships
will join the merchant marine in greater numbers as the Soviets seek to
take full advantage of increased productivity of these ships. Port
facilities will be improved throughout the country with priority assigned
to the installation of additional advanced cargo handling systems.
The Soviet Union has developed a fleet that is particularly well
suited for filling a national defense role. The considerable support
provided to the Navy on a regular basis by merchant ships in replenishment
and refueling operations as well as merchant marine participation in naval
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exercises has enabled the USSR to achieve a degree of coordination and
integration unmatched by any other nation. Centralized control of the
merchant fleet in Moscow makes the shift to wartime military authority a
relatively easy task. The military features of Soviet merchant ships make
them particularly valuable assets in wartime applications.
In this study, political, economic and military objectives pave been
examined as separate categories. In reality, these motives are closely
intertwined in Soviet policy considerations. In contrast with the
strictly commercial concerns of llestern shipping lines, through state
control of the merchant fleet the Soviet Union has been able to
effectively integrate the pursuit of its varied goals. The phenomenal
growth of the USSR's merchant marine is a truly remarkable example of the
advantages of the Soviet planning sy6tem. In that regard, the centrally
directed economy of the Soviet Union was able to marshal its resources in
a manner that, with the exception of wartime exigencies, is impossible in
the West. Responding to the dictates of state plans rather than
commercial considerations, the Ministry of the Merchant F'leet was able to
create a formidable maritime force. That fleet has been, and will
continue to be, an enormous benefit to the Soviet Union in the pursuit of
its various policy objectives.
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